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SECTION

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POLICY FOR UTILIZATION

OF NEGRO MANPOWER

IN THE POST-WAR ARMY

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26 January 1946

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF

WAR DEPARTMENT SPECIAL BOAFD ON NEGRO MANPOWER

To be used in connection with Report of same Board dated 17 November 1946

5-705

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

BOARD MEMBERS DOD DIR 5200,10

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., Chairman

Major General Lewis A. Pick

Brigadier General Winslow C. Morse

Brigadier General Aln D. Warnock, Recorder

UNCLASSIFIED



WAR DEPARTMENT

**C41011** 

Washington, D. C.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF BOARD OF OFFICERS
ON UTILIZATION OF NEGRO MANPOWER IN THE POST-WAR ARMY

26 January 1946

#### I. PURPOSE

A. Statement of the Problem: The Board was directed in a memorandum dated 4 January 1946, a copy of which is attached as Tab A, to reconvene and review comments (Tabs B to K) submitted by the agencies designated by the Chief of Staff to study the original report of the Board which was dated 17 November 1945. The Board was likewise instructed to present to the Chief of Staff, with the least practicable delay, the result of its examination and analyzation of the additional information and data thus made available.


The revised report will cover:

- 1. Clarification of governing principles.
- 2. Foreseeable objectives.
- Necessity for overall policy.
- 4. Revised conclusions.
- 5. Revised recommendations.

The revised (supplemental) report restates and preserves:

- l. The fundamental concept that all plans, policies and programs, involving the utilization of this manpower potential, are based on lessons derived from experience gained in two major wars. These signposts of the past point definitely the future course which, if followed, will go far toward preparing a usable and available military asset.
- 2. The objectives of the plan are targeted on attaining the goal of maximum efficiency in the use of all authorized manpower, should the national resources be again mobilized to defeat an aggressor.
  - B. Plan of Investigation: Before formulating the revised conclusions and amended recommendations submitted herein:





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The Board examined critically the data and comments prepared by the reviewing agencies.

Likewise, in the course of its proceedings, the Board further interviewed representative military and civilian officials concerned and discussed, in detail, the several basic principles involved in the implementation of the policy. The appended Tabs indicate the recommendation affected by comment, the nature of the comment, pertinent discussion, and the resubmitted recommendation.

The Board's additional investigation disclosed the fact that the major commands and subdivisions thereof are fully cognizant of the many inter-related aspects of the recommended policy and are generally in accord. This portends the expectancy of effective implementation by the War Department.

Certain deletions and extensions which have been made in the interest of clarity seem warranted. The questions which follow below have been answered. This should facilitate the preparation of plans and directives based on the policy.

- 1. Should the policy be more detailed?
- 2. For planning purposes, what ratio should be utilized?
- 3. What are the objectives visualized?
- 4. What types and numbers of units are contemplated?
- 5. Do same standards apply to all racial groups?
- 6. Should Recommendation 13 be deleted?
- 7. Is publicity desirable at this time?
- 8. Is there a need for an overall policy?





#### II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

A. General Aspects of Policy: In any study of this document by agencies of the War Department or by the Major Commands, care should be exercised to use it in conjunction with Sections I and II and Tabs appended to the original report of the Board dated 17 November 1945. The basic concepts of the initial report, and stated therein, are applicable to this supplemental report.

The policy enunciated is <u>flexible</u>.

It envisions the economical utilization of this manpower potential as a whole, and yet offers appropriate opportunity to the qualified individual. It fosters by commensurate rewards, initiative and capability without adversely affecting the preparation of long range plans by those charged with that responsibility.

The policy should make available to the nation, an increasingly effective manpower component, provided timely, intelligent and understanding decisions and actions are taken by the agencies and commanders charged with implementation.

B. <u>Clarification</u>: The Board, in its deliberations, considered and dismissed as impractical the preparation of a report, which attempted to foresee all contingencies which might occur at an unknown place at an unknown time. Instead, it presents an overall guide, with accompanying principles, which covers, over a period of time, the foreseen essentials related to the handling of this group.

It envisions changing economic and educational conditions. These environments, most likely, will have a beneficial effect on Negro personnel.


It envisions utilization of the Negro manpower potential in a variety of ways.

It presents essential groupments which can be fitted into the overall mosaic of national security.

It utilizes the war-tested and known ability of the manpower which is presently available.

To attempt more at this time is not deemed feasible.

The report can, and does, prescribe the initial disposition of this manpower group. Therefore, it prescribes what might be termed a "line of departure."





One exception to the above generalization is necessary. Cognizance was taken by the Board of the fact that vitally essential data was required immediately by planning agencies within the War Department. Definite data as to ratios must be indicated.

An arbitrary proportion was inserted in the first recommendation as it was assumed that the Army should utilize the racial proportions within the country, in the military establishment. This would appear as a suitable foundation upon which to build the post-war Army. It approaches the ideal numerical quota. The Board foresees changes to this ratio over a period of time. It visualizes that modifications may be made in the interest of efficiency by the agencies charged with the implementation of this policy.

C. Objectives: The Board visualizes at this time only two objectives:


The <u>Initial Objective</u>: The utilization of the proportionate ratio of the manpower made available to the military establishment during the post-war period. The manpower potential to be organized and trained as indicated by pertinent recommendations.

The <u>Ultimate Objective</u>: The effective use of <u>all</u> manpower made available to the <u>military</u> establishment in the event of a major mobilization at some unknown date against an undetermined aggressor. The manpower to be utilized, in the event of another major war, in the Army without regard to antecedents or race.


When, and if such a contingency arises, the manpower of the nation should be utilized in the best interests of the national security.

The Board cannot, and does not, attempt to visualize at this time, intermediate objectives. Between the first and ultimate objective, timely phasing may be interjected and adjustments made in accordance with conditions which may obtain at this undetermined date.

D. Standards: The Board has incorporated, within several conclusions and recommendations of the original report, the definite statement that the same standard will be required for the appointment of commissioned officers in the military establishment. Throughout its deliberations, the Board has viewed objectively the problem of racial differences. Its basic concept is reiterated. The manpower component, commissioned and enlisted, made available to the military establishment must be analyzed and assigned in a manner that will insure maximum efficiency from the individual and the whole.




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E. Types and Number of Units: The Board, in its original report, indicated the types of units that might be included in the post-war organization. Pertinent data bearing on this subject is contained in designated appendices (Second Part, Tab F) of the original report. It can be stated as an opinion of the Board that all purposes contemplated in the policy for the efficient utilization of the Negro manpower in the post-war Army can be accomplished with units the strength of a type infantry regiment and smaller units. Due to the paucity of information as to the nature and strength of the post-war military establishment at this time, the Board cannot be more definite. To do so would necessitate the inclusion of unwarranted assumptions. The Board has furnished, through the medium of its first recommendation, a manpower ratio. With this ratio it is assumed that the agencies charged with procurement, assignment, organization and training of individuals and organizations of all categories should be able to plan a troop basis.


Further definition as to units or individuals would usurp the prerogatives of planning agencies throughout the echelon of command and, in the opinion of the Board, lies without the scope of the report.

F. Recommendation 13: The Board, in considering a policy with respect to recreational facilities, officers' clubs, messes and similar social organizations, has carefully analyzed the lessons derived from World War II. The opinion of the Board in the premise is expressed in Recommendation 13. During the period of this conflict, over 2,400,000 Negroes were called through the medium of the Selective Service. A maximum number of over 900,000 actually served under the colors. This large segment of the population contributed materially to the success attained by our military forces. In turn, many material and collateral advantages accrued to the men in the service. The Negro enjoyed the privileges of citizenship and, in turn, willingly paid the premium by accepting service. In many instances, this payment was settled through the medium of the supreme sacrifice. During the course of the war years, certain instructions were found necessary and promulgated. Most important, from a racial point of view, were Army Regulations 210-10, dated 20 December 1940 and War Department Memorandum 600-45, dated 14 June 1945. In these regulations the War Department enunciated a policy directed at lessening and ameliorating racial discrimination. This policy has been in effect over a period of years. With the non-concurrence to the retention of the Board's Recommendation 13, the Board cannot agree. It is the considered opinion that the Board's recommendation should not be disapproved. do so would render the War Department's position untenable. The Board, in its report, has visualized and evaluated the progress made by the Negro race in all lines of endeavor during the war years. If the provisions of this recommendation are not approved, the effect on this manpower component will lessen its military value. Therefore, it reaffirms the policy as enunciated in Recommendation 13, which is included herewith.



- G. Publicity: The attention of the Board has been drawn repeatedly to notices in the colored press of the country of the action of the War Department with regard to the use of the Negro manpower in the post-war Army. Much of the material contained in the various publications has been speculative in nature. It is apparent that the press is cognizant, in a general way, of the contents of the report. Therefore, to obviate the possible dissemination of incorrect information bearing on this subject, it is recommended that the War Department agency charged with press relations be directed to prepare a release to the press of the country. By such procedure the War Department can indicate to the citizens of the nation that it is capitalizing on its wartime experience and is profiting by the lessons learned during the war years for the efficient utilization of the manpower potential.
- H. Overall Policy: The study of this problem has indicated clearly that the Army and Navy have followed courses of action in the handling of this component which differ to a marked degree. There is a definite need for correlation between the services. By such procedure, advantage may be taken of the knowledge available to a sister service to the end that all components charged with the national defense may be made more effective.





III. REVISED CONCLUSIONS
(To Be Substituted For Conclusions Contained in Original Report of Board, Dated 17 November 1945)

Having considered the factual and other official materials made available by the War Department and the oral testimony of over 60 military and civilian witnesses, this Board has arrived unanimously at the following conclusions:


- 1. A comparison of the Selective Service Records in two wars indicates that the Negro manpower which may be expected to become available to the Army in case of another national emergency will no doubt exceed that of World War II.
- 2. Considering the advances made by the Negro civilian during the period between World War I and World War II and the increase in numbers available for military service, it is concluded that adequate plans were not prepared for the ultimate utilization of this manpower.
- 3. The advancement of the Negro in education, skills and crafts and resultant economic betterment definitely indicate that if prompt and adequate steps are taken at this time, a greater and more efficient use can be realized from this manpower in the military establishment of the future.
- 4. In the light of past experiences, it is believed that many of the difficulties and much of the confusion encountered in the placement of the Negro manpower during the Selective Service period of World War II could have been eliminated had War Department policies been fully implemented.
- 5. The experiences gained in the utilization of the Negro manpower in two major wars lead to the definite conclusion that if remedial action is taken by the War Department at this time, many of the apparent deficiencies of the Negro Soldier can be eliminated and more efficient results derived from this manpower in the future.
- 6. Many of the deficiencies of leadership attributed to the Negro Soldier in the past can be eliminated by creating in the post-war Army, for purposes of expansion, a broader Negro base of both officers and enlisted men, to assist in the training of the peace-time Army and to provide cadres and leaders to meet more efficiently the requirements of the Army in the event of a national emergency.






- 7. Creation of a broader Negro base in the post-war Army logically includes organization of appropriate elements of any female component.
- 8. To insure understanding and a basis for planning purposes there must be established a ratio of Negro to white manpower in the post-war Army. This ratio, for the present, should be that which exists in the civil population.
- 9. In World War II some types of Negro units demonstrated greater proficiency than others. In general, service units have performed in a more satisfactory manner than combat units. Likewise, some units have consistently better combat records than others. In organizing or activating Negro units to create a broader base in the post-war Army, it is concluded that combat units be stressed.
- 10. For efficient results, the implementation and progressive development of a general policy in preparation for full utilization of Negro manpower in a national emergency will require the closest cooperation and coordination with the War Department, between the War Department and field commanders, and between local commanders and local civil officials.
- ll. Creation of a War Department General Staff Group of selected officers, experienced in command, who can devote their entire time to problems involving minority racial elements in the military establishment is necessary to insure adequate and continuous coordination and cooperation in implementing policy. Creation for the same purpose of a similar group on the staff of each major command is necessary.
- 12. The <u>War Department policy</u> announced for the administration and utilization of minority groups in the <u>post-war Army</u> should be carefully <u>coordinated</u> with <u>policies</u> of the <u>sister</u> services.
- 13. Testimony before this Board has indicated that units composed largely of personnel classified in the two lowest grades on the A.G.C.T. scale require more officer supervision in training and in the field than units composed of personnel of normal distribution. It is concluded, therefore, that attachment of officers to units including abnormal proportions of personnel in Grades IV and V on the A.G.C.T. scale is necessary when time is the critical factor, as it will be under war conditions or under a system of universal military training. This procedure is not necessary in the Regular Army in peace-time.







- 14. The training advantages accruing from a favorable climatic or terrain condition should be evaluated against the factor of unfavorable community attitude with its resultant effect on both training and morale. Troop locations should be selected after a consideration of these opposing factors, due regard being given in all cases to the fact that small civilian communities are incapable of absorbing large numbers of military personnel regardless of race. Exceptions to this principle may be necessary in the event of universal military training, for general efficiency of the military establishment, or in the interest of national security.
- 15. Regardles's of source of procurement and of racial antecedents all officers of all components of the Army should be accorded equal rights and opportunities for advancement and professional improvement as prescribed by law and regulation; and all officers should be required to meet the same standard for appointment, promotion, and retention in all components of the Army.
- 16. The sources of potential officer material can be extended and fostered through the medium of a more comprehensive ROTC and an Army leadership school program.
- 17. Processing of all personnel entering the Army, whether volunteers or selectees, through reception and training centers promote and maintain the efficiency of the Army and will insure proper assignment of individuals.
- 18. The high re-enlistment rate of professional privates in Negro units has in the past denied entry into the service to much potential officer and non-commissioned officer material. Economy and efficiency demand that men of low intelligence and education who have been proven incapable of developing into specialists or leaders be eliminated from the service at termination of the first enlistment. Any policy implemented should include all races.
- 19. There are many places in the framework of the overhead units at Army installations where Negro personnel with special skills can be utilized to advantage as individuals. Periodic surveys of the installations are necessary to determine such positions.
- 20. Experiments and other experiences of World War II indicate clearly that the most successful employment of Negro units occurred when they were employed as units closely associated with white units on similar tasks, and a greater degree of success was obtained when small Negro organizations were so employed.





- 21. Experience, education and tolerance on the part of all personnel of the Army will serve to rectify many of the difficulties inherent in a mixed or composite unit.
- 22. Present War Department policies pertaining to the administration of educational, recreational and messing facilities and of officers' clubs at posts, camps and stations where racial minority elements are located are considered adequate for the present and should be continued in effect.
- 23. The adoption and promulgation without delay of a broad, comprehensive, and progressive policy for the utilization of Negro manpower in the post-war Army will stimulate the Negro's interest, eliminate some of the frustrations, improve morale, and facilitate the development of individual ability and leadership.
- 24. The adoption and promulgation of a policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the military establishment will not in itself achieve the desired result. Steps must be taken concurrently to inform and indoctrinate all ranks of the military establishment concerning the importance to the national security of the successful accomplishment of the program.
- 25. The approval and promulgation of a constructive and progressive policy involving the utilization of this manpower potential should be effected without delay. By such procedure the War Department will indicate clearly an endeavor to capitalize on and benefit from the lessons learned in the school of war.
- 26. Existing laws, regulations and official publications should be examined for determination of any conflict with the proposed policy envisioning a greater utilization of Negro manpower.
- 27. Publication of the approved policy by the War Department will facilitate an understanding attitude insofar as the press of the nation is concerned and thereby indicate that a progressive program aimed directly at the objective of more effective manpower utilization is being implemented.





IV. REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS
(To Be Substituted for Recommendations Contained in Original Report of Board dated 17 November 1945)

#### A. Policy


In order that authorized Negro manpower may be utilized with maximum efficiency during the post-war period, this Board recommends that the War Department adopt, promulgate and implement the following policy:


To utilize the Negro manpower in the post-war Army on a broader professional scale than has obtained heretofore and, through the medium of installations and organizations, to facilitate the development of leaders and specialists to meet effectively the requirements of an expanded war Army. (See Conclusions 1-5 and Facts Bearing on the Problem from Original Report).

#### B. Implementation of Policy

In order to develop the means required for maximum utilization of the authorized manpower of the nation in the event of a national emergency, it is further recommended:


- l. a. That combat and service units be organized and activated from the Negro manpower available in the post-war Army to meet the requirements of training and expansion and in addition qualified individuals be utilized in appropriate special and overhead units. (See Revised Conclusions 6-9 and Tab 1 Supplemental Report, Tabs G 1-2, Original Report).
- b. The proportion of Negro to white manpower as exists in the civil population be the accepted ratio for creating a troop basis in the post-war Army.
- 2. That Negro units organized or activated for the post-war Army conform in general to other units of the post-war Army but the maximum strength of type units should not exceed that of an infantry regiment or comparable organization. (See Revised Conclusion 9, Tab 2, Supplemental Report and Tab G-2, Original Report).





- 3. That in the event of universal military training in peace-time, additional officer supervision be supplied to units which have a greater than normal percentage of personnel falling into A.G.C.T. classifications IV and V. (See Revised Conclusion 13 and Tab 3, Supplemental Report and Tab G-3, Original Report).
- 4. That a staff group of selected officers whose back-ground has included command of troops be formed within the G-1 Division of the staffs of the War Department and each major command of the Army to assist in the planning, promulgation, implementation and revision of policies affecting all racial minorities. (See Revised Conclusions 10, 11, 12 and Tab 4, Supplemental Report and Tab G-4, Original Report.)
- 5. That there be accepted into the Regular Army an unspecified number of qualified Negro officers; that officers initially selected for appointment in the regular establishment be taken from those with experience in World War II; that all officers, regardless of race, be required to meet the same standard for appointment. (See Revised Conclusions 6, 15, 23 and Tab 5, Supplemental Report and Tab G-5, Original Report).
- 6. That all officers, regardless of race, be accorded equal rights and opportunities for advancement and professional improvement; and be required to meet the same standard for appointment, promotion and retention in all components of the Army. (See Revised Conclusion 15 and Tab 5, Supplemental Report and Tab G-10, Original Report).
- 7. That Negro officers to meet requirements for expansion of the regular establishment and for replacements be procured from the following sources:
  - (a) Reserve officers, including ROTC graduates, who shall be eligible for active duty training and service in accordance with any program established for officers of like component and status.
    - (b) Candidates from the ranks.
    - (c) Graduates of the United States Military Academy.
    - (d) Other sources utilized by the Army.


(See Revised Conclusion 16 and Tab 6, Supplementary Report and Tab G-5, Original Report).





- 8. That all enlisted men, whether volunteers or selectees, be routed through reception and training centers, or other installations of a similar nature to insure proper classification and assignment of individuals. (See Revised Conclusions 17, 18 and Tab 7, Revised Report and Tab G-6, 7, Original Report).
- 9. That re-enlistment be denied to Regular Army soldiers who meet only the minimum standards. (See Revised Conclusion 18 and Tab G-6, Original Report).
- 10. That surveys of manpower requirements conducted by the War Department include recommendations covering the positions in each installation of the Army which could be filled by Negro military personnel. (See Revised Conclusion 19 and Tab 8, Supplemental Report and Tab G-6, Original Report).
- ✓ 11. That groupings of Negro units with white units in composite organizations be continued in the post-war Army as a policy. (See Revised Conclusions 20, 21 and Tab 9, Supplemental Report and Tab G-8, Original Report).
- 12. The principle that Negro units of the post-war Army be stationed in localities where community attitudes are most favorable and in such strength as will not constitute an undue burden to the local civilian population be adopted; exceptions to this principle to be premised on the basis of military necessity and in the interest of national security. (See Revised Conclusion 14, and Tab 10, Supplemental Report and Tab G-9, Original Report).
- 13. That at posts, camps and stations where both Negro and white soldiers are assigned for duty, the War Department policies (Tabs J and M, Original Report) regarding use of recreational facilities and membership in officers' clubs, messes or similar social organizations be continued in effect. (See Revised Conclusions 22 and Tab 11, Supplemental Report and Tabs G-10, G-11, J, M, Original Report)
- 14. That the commanders of organizations, installations and stations containing Negro personnel be made fully cognizant of their responsibilities in the execution of the overall War Department policy; and conversely that they be permitted maximum latitude in the solution of purely local problems. (See Revised Conclusion 24 and Tab G-11, Original Report).





15. That the War Department, concurrently with promulgation of the approved policy, take steps to insure the indoctrination of all ranks throughout the Service as to the necessity for an unreserved acceptance of the provisions of the policy. (See Revised Conclusion 24 and Tabs G-11, 12, Original Report).

That approval and promulgation of a policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the post-war Army be accomplished with the least practicable delay. (See Revised Conclusion 23 and 25 and Tab 12, Supplemental Report and Tab G-12, Original Report).

That upon approval of this policy steps be initiated within the War Department to amend or rescind such laws and official publications as are in conflict therewith. (See Revised Conclusion 26).

That the recommended policy (Part IV of this report) as approved by the War Department, with reference to the utilization of the Negro manpower in the post-war Army be unrestricted and made public. (See Revised Conclusion 27, and Tab 12, Supplemental Report and Tab G-12, Original Report).

ALVAN C. GILLEM, JR.

Lt. Gen., U. S. Army Chairman

LEWIS A. PICK

Maj. Gen., U. S. Army

Member

Brig. Gen., U. S. Army Member

ALN D. WARWOCK

Brig. Gen., U. S. Army Recorder, without vote

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U.S. ARMY MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE

TABS A-I.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF

WAR DEPARTMENT SPECIAL BOARD ON NEGRO MANPOWER

COMMENTS OF AGENCIES WHICH

REVIEWED ORIGINAL REPORT

AND


PAPERS DIRECTING THE REVISION

- A. DIRECTIVE ON REVISION
- B. MEMORANDUM FROM MR. ROBERT P. PATTERSON ON MR. McCLOY'S COMMENTS
- C. COMMENTS, MR. McCLOY
- D. COMMENTS, MR. GIBSON
- E. COMMENTS, MR. SOMMERS
- F. COMMENTS, W.D. G-1
- G. COMMENTS, W.D. G-3
- H. COMMENTS, ARMY AIR FORCES
- I. COMMENTS, ARMY GROUND FORCES
- J. COMMENTS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES
- K. OPD REPLY TO AGF QUESTIONS
- L. LIST OF WITNESSES

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WDCSA 320.2 (4 Jan 46)

4 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALVAN C. GILLEM, JR:


SUBJECT: War Department Special Board on Negro Manpower

- 1. The reviews requested by this office of G-1, G-3, and the three major commands having been completed, it is requested that the above named board be reconvened as early as practicable.
- 2. It is desired that the original report of the board be restudied in the light of the comments of the reviewing agencies and such revision made as appears appropriate. In this connection, attention is invited to the several requests of reviewing agencies for a more specific statement of policies especially as they relate to the field and the manner in which the recommended policies should affect unit and post commanders in the post-war period.
- 3. In addition to the reviewing agencies mentioned in paragraph 1 above, comments by the Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War (Colonel Sommers), and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of War (Mr. Truman Gibson) are included.
- 4. Completion of the revised report is desired at the earliest practicable time.
- 5. This directive is authority for the issuance of necessary travel orders for members of the Board to Washington and return to their proper stations at the appropriate time.


BY DIRECTION OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:

(Sgd) H. I. Hodes

H. I. HODES Brigadier General, GSC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff



TAB A
SUP REP
GILLEM BOARD



WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

November 26, 1945.

Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff:

Report of Gillem Board on negro manpower.

The attached comments by Mr. McCloy on the Gillem Board report should be considered by the Chief of Staff, along with the forthcoming comments of G-1 and G-3.

Mr. McCloy, as you know, gave considerable attention to the matter of racial relations in the Army. His views are entitled to a great deal of weight.


/s/ Robert P. Patterson

ROBERT P. PATTERSON,

Secretary of War.


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TAB B SUP REP GILLEM BOARD

UNCLASSIFIED



#### WAR DEPARTMENT

#### OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 November 1945.

#### MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE PATTERSON:

I do not want to leave without giving you my comments on the Gillem Board report on Negro manpower.

The members of the Board have performed a real service. Their report is a great advance over previous studies. It is objective and constructive and, unlike many earlier papers, realistically states the problem in terms of making the most efficient use of available manpower.

I agree with the objectives stated by the Board and particularly like the discussion of past policies and the statement at the bottom of page 6 as to what future policies should be. In general, the note of progressive experiment and development is excellent. I hope it will represent the attitude of the Army on all matters in the post-war period.

I have two principal criticisms which I think I should bring to your attention.

In regard to the basic issue of segregation, I understand the main proposals to be as follows:

- a. for officers, complete equality without regard to race, and abandonment of all forms of segregation.
- b. for enlisted men, progressive experiments with mixed and unsegregated units looking to eventual assignment on the basis of ability alone.

On these fundamental issues, the report does not speak with the complete clarity that is necessary in this field. I do not think this is intentional, although I believe it results from a conscious avoidance of the word "segregation". The report correctly emphasizes the need for strict enforcement of policies, but our experience in this field has shown that we cannot get enforcement of policies that permit of any possibility of misconstruction. If the report means that Negro officers are to



TAB C SUP REP GILLEM BOARD



command white officers and men, it should say so flatly. If it means that we are to try unsegregated units, as well as mixed units consisting of Negro and white detachments, it should say so. If, in either case, it does not mean those things, that should be put beyond doubt. There are a number of places in the report that require bluntness in this respect.


My second objection is to the reference to a quota for Negroes. This occurs in Part IV (Recommendations) at page 15 in the phrases "Within proportions corresponding to those in the civilian population" and "That the over-all proportion not exceed the ratio that existed in World War II".

In the first place, these two provisions are inconsistent, since the proportion of Negroes in the Army during the war did not equal the proportion in the civilian population. But the important objection is that these provisions are inconsistent with the basic premise of the report, that we should make the most efficient use of available manpower. If some future Battle of the Bulge creates a drastic need for replacements and only Negroes are available, we will surely not turn them down on the ground that we have a full quota. Even if the quota is intended as a floor, not a ceiling, it is still objectionable. It tends to lower standards, as we learned in this war. I do not see any place for a quota in a policy that looks to utilization of Negroes on the basis of ability.

Notwithstanding these points, I think this report is a fine achievement for the start of your administration of this field.


/s/ J. J. McC.

J. J. McC.



P-2, TAB C SUP REP GILLEM BOARD

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


WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.

28 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert P. Patterson
The Secretary of War

- 1. I discussed the report of the Gillem Board with Mr. McCloy before he left the War Department. At that time he suggested that I pass on my observations to you. I concur in the view he expressed that the members of the Board had performed a real service. The report is heartening evidence that in the future the Army will not attempt to utilize Negro manpower on the basis of the same temporizing day to day approach that has been followed in the past.
- 2. I agree in general with the two criticisms that Mr. McCloy expressed relative to (a) the necessity for a clear statement on the basic issue of segregation and (b) to the deletion of the quota basis for determining the extent of the inclusion of Negroes in the Army in the future.
- 3. Mr. McCloy's statement supporting these two points of criticism was brief and requires elaboration. While his statement of the two main proposals of the Board is correct, they do not constitute the ultimate aims recommended by the Board. They are rather two methods that must be utilized in reaching them. The Board intended and so stated that Negro officers should be used freely and outside the limits of the restrictive policy of rigid segregation. As for enlisted men, the several references to mixed units show without question that the Board did not feel that the present policy of segregation should be continued.
- Made to assuage the feelings of Negroes. They were not even intended to primarily benefit Negroes. They were included for the purpose of carrying out the basic objective which the Board set out, namely that of making the best possible utilization of a manpower potential that has been greatly misused by the Army in the past. In making use of this reservoir that contains 10% of the nation's population, the Board recommended that Negro enlisted men (a) be utilized in segregated "type" units, (b) be utilized in mixed units and, (c) be utilized as specialists on a basis of individual ability and capacity. Further it was recommended




TAB D SUP REP GILLEM BOARD


# CEOOLT

that Negro officers be utilized without regard to "ceiling" and in the same manner as other officers. The long range objective proposed by the Board is that a policy be ultimately evolved that will permit the utilization of all personnel on the basis of individual ability alone. This means, of course, a completely integrated Army.

- 5. It is not urged that the ultimate objective be reached in one step. Instead a reasonable and practical approach is suggested within the limits of a policy that will not require the segregation of officer and enlisted personnel by race. The Board was at the outset confronted with alternative choices. The members could (a) have followed the present pattern of segregation, (b) could have jumped to the other extreme and required a policy of complete integration, or (c) could permit a progressive and planned integration with particular regard to making the best possible use of individual officers and soldiers of ability. last named course was the one adopted. The Board did not suggest that Negro officers immediately and in large numbers be placed in field units in command of white troops and white officers. It did suggest a course that would permit the utilization of Judge Advocates and medical officers and other specialists in a manner now prohibited by Army policy. In arriving at its recommendation concerning the use of officers, the Board frankly faced the possibility that at a future time, Negro officers would command white officers and white troops. However, this situation is not one that will immediately confront the Army in the event the Gillem Board is accepted. This is one of the details that would be worked out by the The possibility that Negro officers will staff group that is proposed. command white officers and enlisted men at a future date should not operate to prevent the removal of restrictions that have prevented a proper utilization of Negroes in the past.
- 6. In distinguishing between the short term and long term objectives, the Board was greatly influenced by advances that had been made by Negroes in civilian life. The members properly assumed that this progress would continue in the future. They recognize the fact that the oft repeated statement "The Army cannot get ahead of the country," has been used principally as an excuse for not doing anything. Actually the policy of the Army has been far behind practically all sections of the country. The Board was therefore exceedingly wise in allowing for this general progress both within and without the Army.
- 7. The view of the Board on the basic issue of segregation is not revolutionary. The objective of complete integration is discussed in future terms. The immediate procedures recommended by the Board are gradual in nature. Yet, the recommendation that the policy of segregation be abandoned



P-2, TAB D SUP REP GILLEN BOARD




is contrary to all of the thinking that has gone into the preparation of mobilization plans in the last twenty-five years. For years the Army has said "the policy of segregation has been found sound." The Board found this to be untrue. But, since so many people believe that segregation is necessary—it is vital that any deviation from this policy be clearly and explicitly stated. Such statement needs to be in the negative, i.e., what the new policy is not and also in the affirmative, i.e., in general what the new policy will permit. Without such a statement, the general staff group that is proposed will be in a hopeless predicament because they would be assigned the task of implementing a vague policy.

- 8. Since the report of the Board left practically all details to a proposed general staff group, the Civilian Aide to the Secretary should be a member of such a group when organized.
- 9. Not only should a definite policy be prepared, but it should be immediately circulated, as proposed by the Gillem Board. This action will assist the Army in meeting the objections of many people to a system of Universal Military Training and will also result in increasing the number of applications for commissions in the Regular Army from qualified Negro officers who would not be interested in staying on under existing policies.
  - 10. In view of the foregoing, I therefore respectfully urge:
    - a. That the report of the Gillem Board be accepted.
  - b. That a clear and explicit policy be prepared on the basis of the discussion, recommendations, and conclusions of the Gillem Board and that this policy be publicized as soon as possible. It should be particularly explicit on the basic issue of segregation in the following respects:
    - (1) It should state unequivocally that the present Army policies requiring segregation are no longer binding.
    - (2) It should state clearly that the eventual goal is the elimination of segregation.
    - (3) It should state that any intermediate steps to be taken immediately should be defined so clearly as to permit of no misconstruction.
    - c. That the staff group as recommended by the Gillem Board




P-3, TAB D SUP REP GILLEM BOARD



be organized and that the Civilian Aide to the Secretary be appointed to its membership.


/s/ Truman K. Gibson, Jr.

TRUMAN K. GIBSON, JR. Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War



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P-4, TAB D SUP REP GILLEM BOARD



# WAR DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D. C.

30 November 1945


#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

With reference to your conversation with Mr. Gibson this afternoon about the Gillem Board Report, I should like to make the following recommendations: If the Staff Group recommended by the Gillem Board is established, the Advisory Committee on Special Troop Policies should, in my opinion, be discontinued. The field of race relations has never been a popular one in the War Department, and the existence of the Advisory Committee has tended to encourage buck-passing and avoidance of responsibility. The Staff Group should be assigned responsibility in these matters subject only to the usual command channels. Although some supervision of this field by the Secretary or an Assistant Secretary is required, the normal relationship with the Staff should be sufficient if there is a definite assignment of responsibility within the Staff. I concur in the suggestion made by Mr. Gibson that the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War should be associated with the Staff Group, either as a member or as an ex officio consultant.

This recommendation represents only my personal views, as I did not have an opportunity to discuss the matter with Mr. McCloy.

/s/ Davidson Sommers

DAVIDSON SOMMERS Lt Colonel, A.C. Assistant Executive



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TAB E SUP REP GILLEM BOARD



# WAR DEPARTMENT WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF PERSONNEL DIVISION G-1 WASHINGTON

WDGAP/291.2 (24 Nov 45)

27 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Policy for Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army

- 1. The report of the War Department Special board on negro manpower, prepared under the chairmanship of Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr. has been carefully reviewed and studied in the Personnel Division, G-1, WDGS.
- 2. The Personnel Division, G-1, feels that the recommendations submitted, while general, are sound and are a logical solution to the problem of effective utilization of negro manpower. However, from the data available, it is regretted that the recommendations contained in the report are not more specific, but as a statement of policy it is believed they are sufficiently detailed to permit intelligent, effective planning.
- 3. The Personnel Division, G-1, concurs in the report except for section IV, paragraph B 4. A special group in this division is not considered desirable or necessary. We must soon reach the point where our general staff must be able to cope with such problems without the formation of ad hoc committees or groups. This division is in the process of obtaining replacements with command and combat experience.

Incl
WD Special Board
report


/s/ W. S. Paul W. S. PAUL Major General, GSC Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1





TAB F SUP REP GILLEM BOARD

#### UNCLASSIFIFI



ADCofS

FROM G-3 Training, WDGS Col McCaffrey - 2779

FILE NO.

TO

SUBJECT

DATE

WDGCT 291.21 (24 Nov 45) War Department Special Board on

2 January 1946


Negro Manpower

#### SUMMARY

- This division has carefully studied the report of the War Department Special Board on Negro Manpower and submits the following comments and recommendations.
- 2. The report and its supporting papers indicate a thorough investigation and study has been made by the Board of the problems incident to the use of Negro manpower in time of war. The report clearly demonstrates that deliberate and careful planning must be carried on during peacetime to prepare for the most effective use of Negro manpower in time of war.
- 3. The War Department has, during the entire war, led the other services in the progressive use of the Negro to his maximum ability. principles and general policies recommended by the Board are sound and should be accepted. However, in the implementation of the policies to utilize Negro manpower in the postwar Army on a broader professional scale than has heretofore obtained, recognition must be made of the inaptitude and limited capacity of the Negro soldier. The various phases in promulgating the policy must be timed with due consideration for all factors such as public opinion, military It is believed that the establishrequirements and the military situation. ment of the special group on minority matters in G-1 will facilitate this.
- h. It is believed that the conclusions of the Board should be made more specific in the addition of a tab outlining the type units in which experience in World War II has proven the Negro to be more efficient.
- 5. The recommendations made by the Board are concurred in except as indicated below:
- a. Recommendation 4. to establish a staff group of selected officers to handle racial minority policy matters, is concurred in. Since the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 is primarily responsible for the development of all policy matters relating to military personnel, it is considered that the recommended staff section should be in that office rather than in G-3.
- b. Reference is made to paragraph 8, in which it is recommended that all incoming enlisted men be routed through reception centers and training centers. While this procedure is ideal for proper classification and assignment, the probable size of the postwar Army is not likely to be suffici-



TAB G SUP REP GILLEM BOARD



WDGCT 291.21 (24 Nov 45)


ently great to permit implementation of this policy. It is recommended that this proposal be accepted as advisory and approved in principle only.

- c. Reference recommendation 5, officer selection for the Regular Army should be based on equal standards for both Negro and white officers. No attempt should be made to secure any arbitrary percentage of Negro officers.
- d. Reference paragraph 7a, increased emphasis should be placed on the procurement of Negro officers by expansion and close supervision of ROTC's in Negro colleges.

COORDINATION

None.

/s/ I. H. Edwards
I. H. EDWARDS
Major General, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3



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P-2, TAB G SUP REP GILLEM BOARD



War Department Special Board on Negro Manpower

lst Ind Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.

- 1. The inclosed Board proceedings have been read and studied by the Army Air Forces. Unfortunately, nothing can be found specifically to answer the major problems which are confronting the Army Air Forces today in connection with the utilization of negro manpower. Paragraph 2.c. below indicates one of the specific problems for which the findings of the Gillem Board do not indicate a solution.
  - 2. The following specific comments are submitted:
- a. The report emphasizes the fact that it should not be necessary for the Army to be the testing ground for problems in race relationships. With this we emphatically concur. We should not organize certain types of units for the sole purpose of advancing the prestige of one race, especially when it is necessary to utilize personnel that do not have the proper qualifications in order to keep these units up to strength. As the report points out. the formation of negro combat groups was the result of political pressure from a highly organized minority. To fill the requirements for manning these units, AAF standards for flying training had to be dropped far below the white standards. In order to fill quotas for negro pilot training, students were accepted with stanine ratings as low as two (2), whereas the requirement for white students was seven (7). If equality of selection in training is followed, AAF negro tactical units should be authorized in the proportion to negro pilots who successfully complete flying training. The number of these negro units will, of course, still be limited by the factor that the ratio of negro personnel to white personnel in the AAF should not exceed the ratio of the negro to the white in the civil population. At first, the number of negro tactical units should be very small because of the lack of qualified personnel, and thus would utilize but a small percentage of the negroes in the AAF. The remaining negroes should be assigned to AAF service units in which it has been found that their war-time record was the best.
- b. It is recommended in the report that experimental groupings of negro units with white units in composite organizations be continued, and it is suggested that in the AAF, a negro squadron be assigned to a group which has other squadrons of white personnel. We believe, because of the basic characteristics of the AAF, that this may prove impractical. In North Africa, a negro squadron was assigned to a combat group which had other squadrons of white personnel. This experiment proved to be unsuccessful at that time, principally because a group operates as an integral unit rather than as three or four separate squadrons. Personnel and equipment are often interchanged and common messes are often utilized by personnel of more than



TAB H SUP REP GILLEM BOARD one squadron. We feel that composite organizations of negro and white units are practical only when it is not necessary for the units to intermingle continually in order to carry on efficiently. However, we do advocate that the negro flying students attend the same flying schools as the white students. This also carries out the policy as stated in the previous paragraph that the negro should have the same training and qualifications as the white personnel with similar duties.

- c. The Board recommended that negro units be stationed initially in localities where community attitudes are most favorable. The AAF agrees that this is the best policy, but we find that it is extremely difficult to put into effect. We have endeavored for more than two years to find some suitable base for the permanent assignment of our one negro tactical group. Whenever a base was tentatively selected for the unit, the civil officials of that community have vehemently protested, even though a large proportion of the population was negro, Syracuse, N. Y., Columbus, Ohio and Windsor Locks, Connecticut being cases in point. Some communities have even threatened local voluntary bans against selling merchandise to personnel of the unit in case we overrode their objections. It is our opinion that further study will have to be made concerning this policy before it can be Some method should be devised whereby a community receives carried out. some added benefit if a large negro unit is stationed nearby. One suggestion for an inducement would be to have authorization to construct recreational facilities for the negroes which would eventually be given to the community.
- 3. The Army Air Forces believe that the difficulties of the colored problem will be with us as long as any extensive race prejudice exists in the United States. The real solution to the problem lies in the overall education on this subject and will undoubtedly take generations to accomplish. In the meantime, it is believed that the War Department should use great care to march in the van of popular opinion, but that it should never be ahead of popular opinion on this subject; otherwise it will put itself in a position of stimulating racial disorders rather than overcoming them. For example, no order should ever be issued requiring joint use of clubs, theaters, post exchanges, etc. by various races at an Army station in a locality where such is contrary to civil practice in that community. To do so is merely asking for trouble and encouraging it. It also places a burden on the local Commanding Officer which he should not be asked to assume.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

1 Incl (2 cys w/d)

/s/ Ira C. Eaker
IRA C. EAKER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces



P-2, TAB H SUP REP GILLEM BOARD



# HEADQUARTERS ARMY GROUND FORCES WASHINGTON 25. D. C.

18 Dec 1945

370.01 (S) (18 Dec 1945)GNGPS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY:
(Attention: The Deputy Chief of Staff)

SUBJECT: Army Ground Forces Comments and Recommendations on the Report of the War Department Special Board (Gillem) on Negro Manpower, dated 17 November 1945.

#### DISCUSSION

- 1. Reference memorandum, file WDCSA 320.2 (24 Nov 45), subject: War Department Special Board on Negro Manpower, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, dated 24 November 1945.
- 2. This headquarters concurs in general with the conclusions and recommendations of the Gillem Board.
- 3. a. The AGF Study dated 28 November 1945, forwarded to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army (Att: Director, WD Special Planning Division), file 370.01(S) (28 Nov 45) GNDCG, subject: Participation of Negro Troops in the Postwar Military Establishment, recommended:
- (1) That the conclusions reached in this study (Incl #1) be the basis for the formulation and implementation of policies for the future utilization of the Negro in the armed forces of the United States.
- (2) That a policy be formulated at once on the future utilization of Negroes in all the armed forces of the United States.
- (3) That as soon as such a policy is formed, a War Department policy based thereon be formulated and that policy implemented by the major forces of the War Department.
- b. Nothing in the Gillem report changes the opinion of this headquarters on the utilization of Negroes as expressed in the AGF study of 28 November 1945.

#### RECOMMENDATION

1. That the future utilization of the Negro should start with a policy on his utilization in all the armed forces of the United States.



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TAB I SUP REP GILLEM BOARD



370.01 (S) (18 Dec 1945) GNGPS - Memo for CofS, USA

#### RECOMMENDATION Continued

- 2. That a War Department policy be formulated based thereon and be implemented in accordance with the approved conclusions of the Gillem Board.
- 3. That the AGF conclusions previously submitted (Incl #1) be considered as factors along with the conclusions of the Gillem Board in the War Department policy on the utilization of Negroes.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:


/s/ S. R. Knight
S. R. KNIGHT
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Ground Adj. General

1 Incl: (dup)
AGF Conclusions on "Participation
of Negro Troops in the Postwar
Military Establishment."

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P-2, TAB I SUP REP GILLEM BOARD



#### SECTION III

#### CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing study the following conclusions are made:


- 1. That the conception that negroes should serve in the military forces, or in particular parts of the military forces, or sustain battle losses in proportion to their population in the United States, may be desirable but is impracticable and should be abandoned in the interest of a logical solution to the problem of the utilization of negroes in the armed forces.
- 2. That the military manpower of the United States in time of emergency should be assigned to service under the Selective Service and other applicable laws without regard to race.
- 3. That those selected for service in the military forces should be assigned to duties in accordance with their potential capabilities.
- 4. That the same standards should apply to all in the utilization of the individuals of all racial groups in the military forces.
- 5. That the same standards should apply to the assignment, promotion, and the provision of living and recreational facilities, and for awards to individuals of all racial groups.
- 6. That where required standards of proficiency of individuals or units cannot be obtained in the normal allotted periods of training, additional instructions should be prescribed.
- 7. That special attention should be given to the methods of training and handling negro units with a view to developing the most adaptable procedures and techniques.
- 8. That the opportunities for developing officers and non-commissioned officers, both in time of peace and war, be equally available to members of all races.
- 9. That, although Negroes and other enlisted men should not be mixed in the same company or detachment under present conditions, companies or battalions composed of negro enlisted men should be employed alongside of other units in regimental or higher formations. In general, Negroes should not be organized into units larger than battalions until their capabilities are further demonstrated.
- 10. That insofar as capable officers can be developed, the organizations composed of negro enlisted men should be officered by members of that race.

Incl #1

UNCLASSIFIED



P-3, TAB I SUP PEP GILLEM BOARD



#### SECTION III, CONCLUSIONS, Continued

- 11. That there should be included on the Staff of each echelon which contains a unit or units made up of Negroes, officers of that race who can advise as to the problems of assignment and training involved.
- 12. That Negro units should be included in the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves in all types of units which their capabilities permit.
- 13. That units composed of Negroes should be so stationed within the continental limits of the United States as to insure that there will be adequate Negro population close by to provide the necessary social life for the troops and to insure that other causes for racial friction in the locality will be at a minimum.
- 14. That a policy with regard to the utilization of Negroes should be formulated at once as applying to all the armed forces followed by the implementation of that policy within the several forces of the War Department.
- 15. That an effort should be made to improve relations with the press as regards the Negroes in the armed forces.
- 16. That the foregoing are applicable to both peace and war time and to the UMT program.





P-4, TAB I SUP REP GILLEM BOARD



# ARMY SERVICE FORCES OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

28 Dec 1945


MEMOPANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY:

Subject: War Department Special Board on Negro Manpower.

- 1. Reference is made to:
- a. Memorandum, dated 24 November 1945, file WDCSA 320.2 (24 November 1945), subject as above, inclosing copies of reference b below and directing comments and recommendations thereon by 1 January 1946.
- b. Report of War Department Special Board on Negro Manpower, dated 17 November 1945.
- 2. The recommendations of the special board are, in general, concurred in. It is noted that the proposed policy on utilization of Negro manpower is substantially the same as that under which the Army Service Forces successfully utilized during World War II a higher percentage of Negro manpower than is contemplated for the postwar military establishment. The following are specific comments on recommendations of the special board (paragraphs are numbered to correspond with recommendations of the board).
- a. Policy. Concur in the statement of overall policy as recommended.
  - b. Implementation of Policy.
    - (1) Concur.
    - (2) Concur.
    - (3) It has been the experience of Army Service Forces that the need for additional officer supervision is not due solely to the necessity for vigorous prosecution of training such as existed during the past war and will exist under the Universal Military Training Program. In units having greater than normal percentages of personnel in AGCT Classes IV and V, additional officer strength is required to accomplish normal administrative functions. Therefore, additional officer supervision



TAB J, SUP REP GILLEM BOARD




Memo for Chief of Staff, USA Continued.

should be provided for units of this type whether or not there is universal military training in time of peace.

- (4) The concept of staff groups expressly provided to advise and assist in questions involving race is concurred in. Since both personnel and training problems will arise, it is believed that special staff groups should be provided in both G-1 and G-3 divisions of the staffs of the War Department and the major commands.
- (5) It is believed desirable to strengthen this statement of policy by including positive mention of the principle that the same standards for appointment must be required of all officers whether white or colored.
- (6) Concur.
- (7) Concur.
- (8) Concur.
- (9) Concur.
- (10) While the conduct of surveys to determine positions in which Negro military personnel could be employed is not in itself objectionable, any attempt to dictate such employment as a result of a War Department survey would constitute a serious infringement on command responsibility. The responsibility for successful operation of installations is a function of command and this must carry with it freedom of action to select and assign qualified military personnel to the positions involved. Determination of positions which can be filled by Negro personnel should be made at the command echelon. Creation of the special staff groups (recommendation Bh) would appear to provide adequate War Department supervision.
- (11) It is observed that opportunities for experimental groupings of Negro units with white units will occur mainly in combat organizations, particularly at division or higher echelon. The majority of Army Service Forces units are separate organizations of small size, companies



P-2, TAB J SUP REP GILLEM BOARD



Memo for Chief of Staff, USA Continued.

or battalions. It has been the practice during the past war to keep such units homogeneous; and such units have worked well in active operations. Experience indicates that within Army Service Forces mixed units are not practicable below the level of groups and regiments.

- (12) Owing to the location of posts, camps and stations, it is considered inevitable that there will be a burden on the local civilian population wherever Negro units may be stationed. There is probably no ideal station. However, Negro units should be so stationed as to minimize the burden on civilian population both initially and on a continuing basis.
- (13) For the present and the foreseeable future, special intermingling of Negroes and whites is not feasible. It is forbidden by law in some parts of the country and is not practiced by the great majority of the people in the remainder of the country. For example, intermarriage is forbidden by law in a number of states. To require citizens, while in the Army, to conform to a pattern of social behavior different from that they would otherwise follow would be detrimental to the morale of white soldiers and would tend to defeat the effort to increase the opportunities and effectiveness of Negro soldiers. It would be a mistake for the Army to attempt to lead the nation in such a reform as social intermingling of the races. It is therefore considered undesirable to draw particular attention to this controversial problem. Solution of the problem will require a common sense approach in each individual case which appears to be amply provided for by the latitude in solution of local problems to be granted commanders under recommendation Bl4.
- (14) Concur.
- (15) There will be need for proper indoctrination of both white and colored personnel of all ranks. It is assumed that this was the intent of the special board in formulating its conclusions and recommendations.





Memo for Chief of Staff, USA Continued.


- (16) It is agreed that a War Department policy should be formulated and approved with the least practicable delay. Promulgation of the policy should, however, await accomplishment of the action proposed in recommendations Bu and 17. Moreover, implementation of the policies proposed in Bl6, 17 and 18 should be timely rather than precipitate. Implementation should be deferred until there is not a likelihood of interference with achieving satisfactory solution of the major problems now confronting the War Department such as reorganization, the single department, and universal military training. Untimely implementation of these policies might easily defeat passage of a universal military training law.
- (17) The program should provide for rescission of official publications no longer required even though not in conflict with the War Department policy. As to implementation, see (16) above.
- (18) The basic War Department policy (recommendation A) should be publicized at the appropriate time. It is considered inadvisable to publish details of the implementation in the form, for example, of the recommendations of the special board through 18. Such a course of action would serve to put tools in the hands of racial agitators to the possible embarrassment of the War Department. Public releases concerning implementation of the basic policy should be limited to factual accounts of action taken and results obtained. As to implementation, see (16) above.

### 3. It is recommended:

- a. That the War Department approve and adopt the basic policy contained in recommendation A of the special board.
- b. That the War Department approve and adopt recommendations Bl to 12 inclusive and 14 to 18 inclusive modified as indicated below:
  - (1) No change.
  - (2) No change.
  - (3) Delete the phrase "in the event of universal military training in peacetime".



P-4, TAB J SUP REP GILLEM BOARD




Memo for Chief of Staff, USA UNCLASSIFIED Continued.

- (4) Substitute "G-1 and G-3" for "G1 or G-3".
- (5) Add the clause "that all officers irrespective of race be required to meet the same standards for appointment."
- (6) No change.
- (7) No change.
- (8) No change.
- (9) No change.
- (10) Delete present wording and substitute the following:
  "That, in keeping with the overall policy, commanders determine positions within their commands which could be filled by qualified Negro military personnel."
- '(11) No change.
  - (12) Delete the word "initially". Delete the phrase "will not constitute an undue burden to" and substitute "to minimize the burden on".
  - (13) Delete in its entirety.
  - (14) No change.
  - (15) No change.
  - (16) Delete present wording and substitute the following:
    "That a policy for utilization of Negro manpower in
    the postwar Army be approved with the least practicable
    delay and promulgated at the appropriate time following
    implementation of recommendations Bl and 17".
  - (17) Add at end of sentence the phrase "or are no longer required".
  - (18) Insert the word "basic" between "War Department" and "policy".
- c. That recommendation Bl3 of the special board be disapproved.
- d. That implementation of the War Department policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the postwar Army be so timed as not to jeopardize




P-5, TAB J SUP REP GILLEM BOARD




Memo for Chief of Staff, USA Continued.

successful resolution of major problems now confronting the War Department, particularly that of universal military training.

/s/ Daniel Noce
DANIEL NOCE
Major General, GSC
Acting Chief of Staff, ASF



P-6, TAB J SUP REP GILLEM BOARD



WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF D I S P O S I T I O N F O R M

Classification (if any)
SECRET

FILE NO. WDGCT 320 (28 Dec 45)

SUBJECT

Operational and Planning Decisions Required in AGF Plans

TO (Gillem Board) FROM G-3
War Department Special Board on
Negro Manpower

DATE 4 Jan 46 COMMENT NO. 1 Gen Chamberlain/2186/co

The attached memorandum and list of questions and answers concerning the above subject are forwarded to you for information as requested by Operations Division.

I. H. EDWARDS
Major General, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

/s/ Cyrus Q. Shelton

CYRUS Q. SHELTON Colonel, General Staff Executive

Incls
OPD memo to G-3,
4 Jan 46
List of questions &
answers (1 sheet)



TAB K SUP REP GILLEM BOARD



WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Operations Division
Washington 25, D.C.

4 January 1946

OPD 320 (4 Jan 46)


MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3:

SUBJECT: Operational and Planning Decisions Required in AGF Plans

- 1. The Operations Division concurs in the recommendations formulated by AC/S G-3, with the understanding that the following recommendations will be submitted by AC/S G-3 to the War Department Special Board on Negro Manpower (Gillem Board) for full consideration before the final report of that board is formulated:
  - a. That Negro enlisted personnel be assigned to Negro units.
  - b. That no Negro units larger than regiments be authorized.
- c. That Negro units be so formed that they will be capable of being used operationally within white units the size of divisions or larger at the rate of one battalion per division.
- d. That a single standard of professional proficiency be established for both white and Negro officers.
  - e. That no Negro officer be given command of white troops.

J. E. HULL Lieutenant General, GSC Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD

/s/ E. D. Post
E. D. POST
Brigadier General
Deputy Chief, Theater Grp, OPD, GS.





UNCLASSIFIED

P-2, TAB K SUP REP GILLEM BOARD



1. Question: What numbers of Negro troops will Army Ground Forces be required to absorb as of July 1946?

Answer: Army Ground Force plans should contemplate that 10 per cent of enlisted strength authorized that command as of 1 July 1946 will be Negro and that that ratio will thereafter be maintained.

2. Question: What type and size of additional Army Ground Forces units will be authorized to absorb Negro troops?


Answer: Final decision on the type and size of additional Negro units will be based on your recommendations. These recommendations should consider not only the most efficient utilization of Negro manpower, both during the peace period and in the light of a future mobilization, but the desirability of affording the Negro opportunity for combat as well as other types of service. The recommendations of the War Department Special Board on Negro Manpower (Gillem Board) should be given careful consideration.


3. Question: What will the War Department policy be on segregation of Negro troops and officers?

Answer: In general the same policies will be continued as have been in force throughout the war except insofar as they may be modified when final action on the report of the previously mentioned Board is acted on. Such modifications will be published in the form of a policy letter.

4. Question: What restrictions, if any, will be specified as to the use of Negro units in: (a) Zone of Interior? (b) Theaters? (c) Possible combat zone?

Answer: It is not contemplated that restrictions will be specified as to the use of Negroes in the Zone of the Interior or in theaters as presently constituted. Generally speaking the 10 per cent ratio should be army-wide. Insofar as it is practicable to do so Negroes should be stationed in localities where recreational and social facilities are available among members of their own race.





#### TAB L

LIST OF WITNESSES EXAMINED IN REVISION PROCEEDINGS OF WAR DEPARTMENT SPECIAL BOARD ON NEGRO MANPOWER

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower General Thomas T. Handy Lt. General J. Lawton Collins

<u>ASF</u>

Brigadier General Aaron Bradshaw Colonel J. S. Leonard Colonel K. A. McCrimmon

AGF

Major General C. L. Bolte Brigadier General B. C. Clarke

AAF

Lt. General Ira E. Eaker Brigadier General John Upston

W.D. G-1

Major General Willard S. Paul Colonel R. F. Button Lt. Colonel E. B. Long

W.D.G-3

Colonel W. J. Macaffrey Lt. Colonel F. Ruddell

0.S.W.

Mr. Marcus H. Ray, Civil Aide to Secretary of War Mr. H. C. Petersen, Assistant Secretary of War



### SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF

### WAR DEPARTMENT SPECIAL BOARD ON NEGRO MANPOWER

INDEX TO TABS 1 TO 12

DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC COMMENTS MADE BY VARIOUS
REVIEWING AGENCIES AS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE
BY THE BOARD IN ITS ORIGINAL REPORT DATED 17 NOV-

**EMBER 1945** 

### Tab


### Contents

- 1. RATIO OF NEGRO MANPOWER
- 2. ORGANIZATION AND SIZE OF NEGRO UNITS
- 3. ADDITIONAL OFFICERS IN EVENT UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING IS ESTABLISHED
- A. STAFF GROUP IN G-1 DIVISION
- 5. SINGLE STANDARD FOR ALL OFFICERS
- 6. EMPHASIS ON NEGRO R.O.T.C. UNITS
- 7. ENLISTED MEN ROUTED THROUGH RECEPTION AND TRAINING CENTERS
- 8. SURVEYS TO DETERMINE POSITIONS
- 9. GROUPING OF NEGRO AND WHITE UNITS
- 10. LOCATION OF NEGRO UNITS
- 11. RECREATIONAL FACILITIES
- 12. PROMULGATION OF POLICY WITHOUT DELAY



UNCLASSIFIED





#### Tab 1

## Ratio of Negro Manpower

- 1. Comment By Assistant Secretary of War McCloy: a. I do not see any place for a quota in a policy that looks to full utilization of Negroes on the basis of ability.
- b. Proposed plan of using Negroes in proportion to the civilian population, not, however, to exceed the ratio of Negro to white troops in World War II, is inconsistent. The proportion of Negroes in the Army in World War II did not equal the proportion in the civilian population.
- 2. By the Board: By unanimous opinion, the ratio of Negro to white troops should be the same as in the civilian population. This is necessary both for intelligent planning and for the need to establish a troop basis for implementation of policy.

#### Tab 2

## Organization and Size of Negro Units

- 1. Comment a. By the Army Ground Forces: No units larger than battalions should be formed until their capabilities are further demonstrated. Negro units should be officered by members of that race.
- b. By the Army Air Forces: The assignment of a Negro squadron to a group composed of white squadrons may not prove practical. Composite units of Negro and white units are practical only when it is not necessary for the units to intermingle continually in order to carry on effectively.
- 2. By the Board: a. No units to be formed larger than an infantry regiment which will be used to form cadres when required.
  - b. Negro units should eventually be commanded by Negro officers.
- c. A need exists for improved leadership qualities in Negro officers and non-commissioned officers.
- d. Qualified officers should be assigned to the staffs of larger units and headquarters. In addition, professionally and technically qualified Negro officers should be given assignments as medical officers, Chaplains, Judge Advocates and Inspectors.
- e. No need exists for the assignment of Negro commanders to units composed of white troops.





### Tab 3

# Additional Officers in Event Universal Military Training is Established

- 1. Comment By Army Service Forces: Recommended deletion of "in the event of Universal Military Training" in Board's proposal that additional officer supervision be supplied to units having a greater than normal percentage of personnel falling into AGCT classifications IV and V.
- 2. By the Board: Recommendation requires this phrase as the problem of utilizing Negro manpower in the postwar Army will be twofold:
- a. In the professional Regular Army: Enlisted personnel of a Regular Army unit should be carefully screened to eliminate more than a normal percentage falling into AGCT classifications IV and V and with permissible personnel falling into classification V, held to a minimum. With Negro officers to be selected according to a single standard for all officers, the normal quota authorized in any Table of Organization, should be sufficient.
- b. Trainees under a system of Universal Military Training: Under such a program, trainees will be falling largely into AGCT classifications IV and V. For this reason, the original recommendation of additional authorized officer strength should stand.

### Tab 4

## Staff Group in WDGS G-1 Division

- 1. Comment a. By the WDGS G-1 Division: The Personnel Division does not believe a special group in the Division is desirable or necessary. We must soon reach the point where our general staff must be able to cope with such problems without the formation of ad hoc committees or groups.
- b. By WDGS G-3 Division: Concurs in the proposed establishment of a staff group of selected officers to handle racial minority policy matters. Since the Assistant Chief of Staff G-lisprimarily responsible for the development of all matters relating to military personnel, it is considered that the recommended staff section should be in that office rather than G-3.
- 2. By the Board: After discussions with members of G-1 and G-3 Divisions, the recommendation should now state that the group be formed, composed of Regular Army officers and located in WDGS G-1 Division.





Tab 5


# Single Standard for Selection of All Officers

- 1. Comment a. By Army Service Forces: Add the clause, that all officers, irrespective of race, be required to meet the same standards for appointment.
- b. By WDGS G-3 Division: No attempt should be made to secure any arbitrary percentage of Negro officers.
- 2. By the Board: The single standard is proposed for appointment, promotion, rights, opportunities, and retention of all officers in the Regular Army.


Tab 6

# Emphasis on Negro ROTC Units

- 1. Comment By WDGS G-3 Division: Increased emphasis should be placed on the procurement of Negro officers by expansion and close supervision of ROTC's in Negro colleges.
- 2. By the Board: a. Re-emphasis is given on the importance and soundness of a strong and closely supervised Negro ROTC program.
- b. Expansion of the prewar Negro ROTC program to add technical units is recommended.







### Tab 7

## Enlisted Men Routed Through Reception and Training Centers


- 1. Comment By WDGS G-3 Division: While the procedure of routing enlisted men through reception and training centers is ideal for proper classification and assignment, the probable size of the post-war Army will be too small to follow this plan.
- 2. By the Board: Allowance must be made for the probable twofold status of the post-war Army:
- a. The professional Regular Army: Whenever practicable the above plan should be followed. When not, a system should be established whereby the enlistee, not passing through a reception and training center, will be properly classified and correctly assigned.
- b. Trainees under a Universal Military Training program: It is essential that Negro trainees, of which the bulk can be expected to fall into AGCT classifications IV and V, pass through reception and training centers to insure proper classification and adequate basic training.

### Tab 8

## Surveys to Determine Positions

- 1. Comment By Army Service Forces: Instead of a War Department survey to determine positions in various installations that could be filled by Negro personnel, commanders should determine these positions in keeping with a stated, overall policy.
- 2. By the Board: a. The proposed staff group to handle racial minority problems, by working with higher field headquarters, can accomplish the purpose of this survey without unduly encroaching on the prerogatives of field commanders.
- b. Delegation of responsibility for this survey by the War Department to the field, hazards lack of uniformity and makes results doubtful.





### Tab 9


## Grouping of Negro and White Units


- 1. Comments a. By Army Air Forces: The assignment of a Negro squadron to a group composed of white squadrons may prove impractical. Composite organizations of Negro and white units are practical only when it is not necessary for the units to intermingle continually in order to carry on effectively. However, Negro flying students should attend the same flying schools as the white students.
- b. By the Army Service Forces: Experience indicates that within the Army Service Forces mixed units are not practicable below the level of groups and regiments.
- 2. By the Board: a. Experiments in World War II indicated that Negro and white troops could be grouped successfully.
- b. The best results were indicated from the grouping of small Negro units with larger white units.
- c. Mixed groupings of units should be continued in the post-war Army with a view toward promoting and facilitating mobilization of the nation's full manpower in an emergency.

### Tab 10

### Locations of Negro Units

- 1. Comments By the Army Service Forces: Owing to the location of posts, camps and stations, it is considered inevitable that there will be a burden on the local civilian population wherever Negro units may be stationed. There is probably no ideal station.
- b. By the Army Air Forces: The AAF agrees Negro units should be stationed initially where community attitudes are most favorable. This has been found extremely difficult to put into effect. We have endeavored for more than two years to find some suitable base for the permanent establishment of one Negro tactical group. When a base was selected, the civil officials of that community have vehemently objected, even though the communities involved were in the North and had large Negro populations.
- 2. By the Board: Negro units should be stationed in areas where the community attitude is most favorable. This should be used only as a guide rather than a fixed policy and should be administered on that basis.





### Tab 11

## Recreational Facilities

- 1. Comment a. By the Army Air Forces: It is not necessary for the Army to be the testing ground for race relationships. No order should ever be issued requiring joint use of clubs, theaters, post exchanges, messes, etc.. in a locality where such practices are not followed in that community.
- b. By the Army Service Forces: For the present and foreseeable future, social intermingling of Negroes and whites is not feasible. It is forbidden by law in some parts of the country and is not practised by the great majority of people in the remainder of the country. It would be a mistake for the Army to attempt to lead the nation in such a reform as social intermingling of the races.
- 2. By the Board: a. Existing Army Regulations with respect to use of officers' clubs, post exchanges, messes, etc., should be continued in effect.
- b. Sufficient latitude is allowed in present War Department regulations to enable local commanders to administer local situations.

### Tab 12

## Promulgation of Policy Without Delay

- 1. Comment a. By Army Service Forces: A staff group should be formed to assist and advise on questions involving race. It is believed that such staff groups should be provided in both WDGS G-1 and G-3.
- b. By WDGS G-1: A special group is not considered necessary or desirable. Such problems should be a general staff function to be handled without the formation of ad hoc committees or groups.
- 2. By the Board: a. The overall policy should be promulgated without delay.
  - b. A staff group should be formed.
  - c. Publicity should be given to the policy, when approved.

